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ABSTRACT 
The aim of this paper is to test empirically the role of both cognitive and structural social capital 
in explaining the repayment performance of individual members under joint liability borrowing 
in rural Armenia. Based on unique primary data collected in 2006 in Ararat, Armavir and Vayots 
Dzor  provinces,  overall  86  observations,  we  estimated  the  Logit  model  to  identify  the 
determinants associated with good or bad repayment behavior of individual members.  
The results revealed that the members with higher level of structural and cognitive social capital 
as well as with higher farm productivity performed better. This indicates the importance of social 
as well as economic determinants for the decision and the ability of borrower’s to repay the 
credit.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Following  theoretical  models,  joint  liability  lending  schisms  have  positive  impact  on  the 
repayment performance of borrowers. The expected success is basically attributed to the non-
traditional characteristics of the collateral, specifically social collateral used. In the sense that 
social  collateral  of  borrowers  takes  the  place  of  traditionally  accepted  forms  of  physical 
collateral, joint liability lending relies upon social capital
1 of the group (BESLEY AND COATES, 
1995). Under such lending conditions, the group takes the liability for the individual loans of 
members  and  by  that  overcomes  the  problem  of  lack  of  traditional  forms  of  collateral.  By 
delegating  the  function  of  screening,  monitoring,  and  enforcement  of  loans  to  the  group 
members, banks in their turn overcome the problem of asymmetric information and accordingly 
the problem of prohibitively high transaction costs
2 (GHATAK AND GUINANE, 1998). Pointing on 
the main hypothesis of such programs, that is the comparative advantages of collective actions in 
screening, monitoring and in enforcement activities, STIGLIZ (1990) argues that group members 
have better access to information on reputation, creditworthiness and an intended purpose of peer 
borrowers.  Moreover,  people  connected  with  social  ties  have  better  possibility  to  enforce 
repayment  by  implementing  social  sanctions  against  defaulters  (BESLEY  AND  COATE,  1995). 
Consequently,  the  horizontal  social  relations  among  actors  are  critical  as  the  base  for  the 
knowledge  on  the  reputation,  credibility  and  enforcement.  GHATAK  (1999)  suggests  that  by 
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1 The World Bank defined social capital as “the norms and social relations embedded in the social structures of 
societies that enable people to coordinate action to achieve desired goals” (WORLD BANK 2000, p.1). In respect to its 
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difficult to observe. It consists of “shared norms, values, trust, attitudes and beliefs” (UPHOFF 1999, p.218). 
2 “Transaction costs are costs resulting from information search, market entry and exit costs for borrowers, savers, 
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implementing group lending practices, banks get a chance to distinguish good borrowers from the 
risky ones. Under group lending schemes the good borrowers will select higher joint liability and 
lower interest rate contracts. Risky borrowers, on the other hand, will select lower joint liability 
and higher interest rate contracts. The concept of joint liability can thus be understood as a forced 
risk sharing arrangement technique which in theory can lead to higher repayment rates (BESLEY 
1995). By the end of 1980s increasing number of microfinance institutions already adopted joint 
liability techniques to reach the poor and disadvantageous groups of communities
3.  
Despite the  existing theoretical literature there is little empirical evidence to prove the basic 
assumptions of screening, monitoring, enforcement and the efficiency of such models. Especially 
the connection between social capital indicators – i.e. trust, associational life, collective action 
and the repayment rates of such groups is not well documented. This article aims to contribute to 
the existing empirical literature by analysing the impact of different aspects of social capital on 
the repayment performance of individual members of joint liability lending projects in Armenia.  
The  article  is  orgnised  as  follows:  Section  1  draws  on  empirical  studies  concerning  the 
determinants  of  repayment  rates  in  group  lending.  Section  2  presents  the  data  and  the 
methodology used in the analysis. The results of the regression model are presented in section 3 
and Section 4 concludes the paper. 
1. REVIEW OF EMPIRICAL STUDIES 
The  findings  of  empirical  studies  concerning  the  determinants  of  repayment  rates  in  group 
lending in respect to social capital indicators are controversial. WYDICK (1999) in his study in 
Guatemala  recorded that social cohesion and the strong social ties have rather negative than 
positive impact on repayment rates. In the case of Bangladesh, SHARMA  AND ZELLER (1997) 
found a negative relationship between the presence of relatives in the group and the repayment 
rates. They also stated that the groups which followed the self-selection criterium perform better. 
Similarly, VAN BASTELAER AND LEATHERS (2006) identified a negative relationship between the 
participation in the same church and the repayment rates of joint liability seed groups in Zambia. 
WENNER (1995) on the other hand in his study in Costa Rica pointed out that the written internal 
rules about ones expected behavior in the group facilitate credit repayment. The results were 
supported by ZELLER’s (1998) findings in Madagascar where the groups with stronger social ties 
and with internal rules performed better.  
2. DATA AND METHODOLOGY  
This contribution is based on field research conducted in 2006 in Ararat, Armavir and Vayotz 
Dzor provinces of Armenia. By the use of direct observations and semi structured questionnaire 
the members of six randomly selected joint liability groups
4, which include 86 individual group 
members,  were  interviewed.  The  information  on  different  social  as  well  as  the  economic 
indicators of respondents was obtained.  
During interviews it became obvious that the enforcement assumption of peer pressure by the use 
of social sanctions does not work efficiently in the case of Armenia. It was recorded that though 
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the members have sufficient information to predict who will and who will not default and are 
aware of each others income and life situation and the ability to repay or the willingness to repay, 
they are reluctant to sanction those who default. The cultural factors to keep good and long 
lasting relationship with the neighbors and relatives (possibly as social safety nets) seem to be 
more important than the short time benefits accruing from borrowing. This makes it difficult to 
impose social sanctions, as no case of a social sanction was recorded we hypothese that other 
specific types of social capital facilitate repayment. By and large following VAN BASTELAER AND 
LEATHERS (2006), we classify the social capital indicators as those affecting collective action, the 
proxies of structural social capital and the proxies of cognitive social capital.  
In order to examine the relative significance of the different aspects of social capital that are 
believed to influence the repayment behavior of individual credit group members, an empirical 
logit model was estimated. SPSS 14 was used for the analysis. 
3. THE EMPIRICAL MODEL AND THE RESULTS 
The logit model tests the hypothesis that the presence of social capital within a group facilitates 
loan repayment behaviour of its members. The model is as follows: 
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where repayment behaviour of joint liability group members is measured as a binary variable (yes 
= credits are repaid on time, no = credits are not repaid on time). The parameter c_a stands for 
the factors affecting collective action in the group; s_sc stands for structural social capital proxied 
by the associations to which the actors belong. Cognitive social capital, c_sc identified by the 
level of trust towards each other in the group (most members can be trusted, you can’t be too 
careful) and scv stands for selected control variables, i.e., total value of household items. The 
definitions of the variables involved in the model are presented in Table 1.  
 
By applying this model, the following hypotheses are tested: 
1. Factors affecting collective action in groups, i.e. group homogeneity: A positive relationship 
exists between the perception of group homogeneity and the repayment behavior, as it allows 
better efficiency of group dynamics (group homogeneity in terms of risks). Furthermore, family 
relations  facilitate  collective  action  and  credit  repayment  since  the  information  flow  among 
relatives is higher.  
2. Proxies of structural social capital: A higher level of involvement in associational activities 
facilitates one’s adherence to norms and accordingly to better credit repayment.  
3. Proxies of cognitive social capital: The repayment behavior of individual members depends on 
the existing trust in the group in the way that the higher the trust is the better is the repayment 
behavior. 
4. Selected control variables: Total value of household items as an indicator of wealth status of 
the  borrowers,  off-farm  employment  as  an  indicator  of  increased  family  budget  and  risk 
diversification and higher farm productivity enhance the capacity of an individual to repay the 
loans on time and will therefore have a positive effect on repayment behavior. Involvement in   5 
non-farm  activities  will  imply  income  diversification.  That  means,  if  for  some  reason  farm 
income is zero, families still have a source of income and are more probable to repay the loan. 
 
Table 1. Definition of variables involved in the model 
Variables  Definitions 





Proxies for structural social capital: 
MPRODC 
MPOLP 
Proxies for cognitive social capital: 
TRUST 
 





Members'  perception  of  group’s  homogeneity  in 
respect  to  income  (1  =  mostly  same  income  level) 
and (2 = mixed rich/poor)  
Family relations (1 = yes, else = 0) 
 
Member of production cooperative (1=yes, else = 0) 
Member of political party (1=yes, else = 0) 
 
Trust in group members (1 = most members in the 
group can be trusted, else = 0) 
 
Off-farm employment (1 = yes, else = 0) 
Farm productivity (US$) divided by 1000 
Total  value  of  household  assets  (US$)  divided  by 
1000 
 
The results of the regression analysis are presented in Table 2. The significance level of variables 
shows, members' perception of group homogeneity in respect to income (with the negative sign), 
trust towards other group members, membership in production cooperative, farm productivity are 
significant determinants for individual members credit repayment.  
   6 
Table  2  Results  of  regression  analysis  for  the  repayment  model  estimated  by  logit 
estimation 
  Coefficient  S.E.  Wald  Significance 
FAMREL     .523    .907     .907    .565 
INCOMEH  - 1.915  1.115    2.949    .086* 
TRUST   4.335  1.134  14.608    .000*** 
MPRODC   3.650  1.104  10.922    .001*** 
MPOLP     .017  1.733      .000    .992 
OFFFEMP     .428    .858      .248    .618 
FARMP   1.696    .764    4.923    .027** 
TVHHI     .137    .328      .174    .676 
Constant  - 4.844  1.620    8.937    .003*** 
Source:   Own calculation;  
Notes:   Negelkerke  R² =  0. 736, *Significance  at  the  10% level, **Significance  at  the  5% level, 
***Significance at the 1% level 
 
The significance of the perception of the income homogeneity variable (INCOMEH) shows that 
the perception of individual members about the same social status, economic power and credit 
risk of other borrowers have rather negative than positive effect on repayment behavior. This 
indicates that under specific situation group members may use the benefit of collective action 
rather to avoid than to enforce repayment. The family relations (FAMREL) variable seems not to 
be  a  significant  determinant  of  good  performance.  Though  family  relations  may  facilitate 
collective action in a group there is no guarantee that the action is positive. The cognitive social 
capital, proxied here by (TRUST) between group members is significant on 1% level and is 
positive. This may indicate that the repayment of individual members depends on their subjective 
belief  that  other  members  in  the  group  will  repay  their  loans  too.  This  is  important  as  the 
repayment of others may determine if the loan will be available in the next round or not. As 
BASLEY AND COATE (1995) noticed, if the same good individuals observe others defaulting, they 
may default too, since they will not receive a new loan even if they repay and they do not need to 
repay the loans of others. The significance of one of the proxies of structural social capital, that is 
the membership in the local production cooperative (MPRODC), indicates that the membership 
in associations indeed facilitates one’s adherence to norms and better credit repayment. However, 
it may merely be done to secure good social reputation to ensure future economic benefits. As the 
variable 'membership in the political party' (MPOLP) is not significant we may conclude that at 
present economic associations play more important role in relation to rural financial markets in 
Armenia. The significance of 'farm productivity' (FARMP) shows the importance of economic 
factors on ones decision and the ability for payback of a loan. It seems that the individuals with 
good  harvest  performed  better,  which  indicates  that  higher  farm  productivity  enhances  the 
capacity  and the willingness of  an individual to repay the loans on time. The total value of 
household  items  (TVHHI)  as  the  indicator  of  wealth  status  of  the  borrowers  and  off-farm   7 
employment (OFFFEMP) as the indicator of increased family budget and risk diversification 
failed to explain repayment behavior of members 
 
4. CONCLUSIONS  
The theoretical models of joint liability lending argue that through the use of social capital of 
borrowers, the repayment performance of groups is improved. This is because the peers are better 
able to screen, monitor and enforce loan repayment of each other. The empirical studies to test 
the hypothesis of such models are not many and the findings are diverse. This paper shortly 
reviewed both, theoretical and empirical literature. By estimating a logit model, the significance 
of different social capital indicators on the loan repayment performance of individual credit group 
members  on  the  basis  of  their  social  capital  structure  was  studied.  The  econometric  results 
showed that the members with a higher level of structural and cognitive social capital as well as 
of higher farm productivity performed better. This clearly points to the importance of both, social 
as well as the economic factors on credit repayment. However, the impact of social factors such 
as trust and reputation seems to overwhelm the impact of economic indicators. The significance 
of both cognitive and structural social capital proxies supports the notion that different aspects of 
social capital are important in such an analysis. Consideration of only one type to the exclusion 
of the others may produce misleading results and biased estimations. 
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